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The information used to choose the larger of two objects from memory was 
investigated in two experiments that compared the effects of a number of variables 
on the performance of subjects who either were instructed to use imagery in 
the comparison task or were not so instructed. Subjects instructed to use 
imagery could perform the task more quickly if they prepared themselves with 
an image of one of the objects at its normal size, rather than with an image 
that was abnormally big or small, or no image at all. Such subjects were 
also subject to substantial selective interference when asked to simultaneously 
maintain irrelevant images of digits. In contrast, when subjects were not 
specifically instructed to use imagery to reach their decisions, an initial image 
at normal size did not produce significantly faster decisions than no image, or a 
large or small image congruent with the correct decision. The selective interference 
created by simultaneously imaging digits was reduced for subjects not told to 
base their size comparisons on imagery. The difficulty of the size discrimination 
did not interact significantly with any other variable. The results suggest that 
subjects, unless specifically instructed to use imagery, can compare the size of 
objects in memory using information more abstract than visual imagery. 
The problem of how information about continuous dimensions is coded 
in memory has been the focus of several recent experimental studies. 
Much of this interest has resulted from the possibility that memory 
representations of such dimensions may be continuous, in much the same 
way as we conceive of the dimensions themselves. For example, objects 
in the world can take on essentially continuous objective size values. 
It is true, of course, that human perception, and presumably 
memory as well, have limited resolution, so that two objects may 
vary in size by so little that a person cannot discriminate between them 
on that basis. It is also possible that at a physiological level, magnitude 
information is represented by processes involving discrete events, such 
as neural firing. Nevertheless, at the level of description relevant to a 
cognitive model, size information in memory might be best conceptualized 
as approximating a continuously varying analog measure. 
Evidence that size information is analog in the above sense has been 
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provided by studies that have measured people’s reaction time (RT) 
to decide from memory which of two objects is larger. The basic 
finding that has emerged is that RT in this task decreases as the 
objective size difference between the two objects is increased. This 
result was first obtained by Moyer (1973) using animal names. He found, 
for example, that people could decide that a horse is bigger than a 
roach more quickly than they could determine that a horse is bigger than 
a sheep. This result, replicated by Jamieson and Petrusic (1975), has been 
extended by Paivio (1975) to objects other than animals. Using arti- 
ficial materials, Moyer and Bayer (1976) have provided evidence that 
decision time depends not simply on the ordinal difference between two 
objects, but on the difference between their absolute magnitudes. 
This “symbolic distance effect,” as it has been termed by Moyer and 
Bayer, has been found in a number of similar comparison tasks involving 
other dimensions. These include comparisons of digits (Banks, Fujii, & 
Kayra-Stuart, in press; Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Moyer & Landauer, 
1967; Parkman, 1971; Sekuler, Rubin, & Armstrong, 1971) and of terms 
drawn from the natural-language scales of time, temperature, and 
quality (Holyoak & Walker, 1976). A related distance effect has been 
obtained with arbitrary names taught to subjects as a linear order along 
some dimension (Potts, 1972, 1974). In all of these domains there is 
therefore evidence consistent with the view that the ease of discriminating 
between stored dimensional values reflects the subjective difference 
between the magnitudes of such values. 
What remains unclear, however, is the exact nature of the information 
underlying the symbolic distance effects obtained in different domains. 
Do all involve analog representations of magnitude information? How 
similar is the form of information about different dimensions, such as 
size and numerical magnitude? While theorists have speculated that a 
common analog representational system may underlie different domains 
(Moyer & Bayer, 1976), there is as yet no direct evidence for 
this view. The lack of a clear account of the form in which 
analog size information might be stored has been pointed out by Moyer: 
“A serious deficiency in this formulation is, of course, that the nature 
of the postulated analogue representations is not specified. They may be 
positions along an imagined spatial dimension, temporal patterns in neural 
ensembles, rich images, or an as yet unimagined possibility” (1973, p. 
183). 
Given this limited state of knowledge, it seems that a fairly detailed 
analysis of the possible forms of representation used in particular 
task domains may be a prerequisite to any general model of mental 
comparisons. The present study investigates the possible role of visual 
imagery in mental size comparisons. The size dimension was chosen 
because it offers a rich data source, since people know the size relations 
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between a great many objects, and because the mechanisms underlying size 
comparisons may plausibly be expected to generalize at least to other physical 
dimensions such as length, height, and brightness. In addition, size compari- 
sons are known to produce a clear distance effect. Visual imagery, while not 
the only possible mode of analog size representation (as argued below), has 
been suggested as a possible candidate by theorists such as Moyer. People 
commonly report images while making mental size comparisons, and while 
it is difficult to imagine how visual imagery could underlie all analog 
dimensional information (particularly for nonperceptual dimensions, such 
as intelligence or time), it remains a plausible possibility for the other 
physical dimensions most related to size. These considerations suggested 
that an investigation of imagery and alternatives to imagery in the domain 
of size comparisons might offer some insight into the general question 
of how continuous dimensional information is remembered. 
Three possible views of the information used for size comparisons 
are outlined below, along with arguments in support of each. Two 
experiments that attempted to provide evidence discriminating among 
these views are then reported. 
Hypothesis 1: Imagery Is Always Used 
The hypothesis that imagery has a central role in the size comparison 
process was first suggested by the striking similarity of the functions 
relating RT and objective distance in mental size comparisons (Moyer, 
1973) and in perceptual comparisons, such as comparisons of line 
lengths (Johnson, 1939). In both cases, the function seems to be 
approximately inversely linear with the logarithm of the difference in 
magnitude of the two objects being compared (Moyer, 1973). Moyer 
argues that this similarity suggests that mental size comparisons involve 
an “internal psychophysical judgment.” Visual imagery would seem to 
provide a possible basis for such a judgment. When presented with the 
names of two objects, a person may retrieve images of each 
object from long-term memory, and then compare the size of the two 
images to make a decision. Since images are presumably analogs of the 
actual objects, this internal comparison process might be expected to 
show effects very similar to those found in actual perceptual comparisons. 
This hypothesis invokes the notion of a processor that can scan images. 
Pylyshyn (1973) has argued that such a processor must be a mythical 
“mind’s eye,” and that it leads to an infinite regress. However, the 
notion of a device that can compare images seems no more mysterious 
than any other executive processor postulated in information processing 
models. Kosslyn (1975) offers some suggestions as to how an image 
processor might operate. 
Paivio (1975) has obtained an additional result which might appear 
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to favor the imagery hypothesis. He found that size comparisons could 
be made more quickly when the stimuli were pictures rather than names 
of the items. Hypothesis 1 predicts this result, assuming that images 
are aroused more quickly by pictures than by words. The imagery hypothe- 
sis also clearly accounts for the intuition of many people that they 
experience visual imagery in the size comparison task. 
Hypothesis 2: Imagery Is Sometimes Used 
This second view could be formulated in various ways, but one pos- 
sibility is that imagery plays a central role only in those size comparisons 
that require especially close discriminations. For example, consider a 
modified version of the model proposed by Banks et al. (1976) for 
comparisons of numerical magnitude. It could be that objects very dif- 
ferent in size (e.g., elephant and mouse) are coded in different size 
categories (e.g., “large” and “small”). This categorical information 
would be sufficient to decide which object is larger. However, objects 
relatively close in size (e.g., wolf and dog) would likely fall into the same 
size category. For pairs close in size categorical information will there- 
fore not distinguish the relative size of the objects, so that it will be neces- 
sary for the person to retrieve more precise analog size information. If 
this analog information is in the form of visual images, it follows that 
visual imagery will be central to the comparison process only for object 
pairs relatively similar in size. 
This hypothesis is consistent with the intuition of some people that they 
mainly experience visual imagery in the size comparison task when the 
discrimination is especially difficult. It suggests that the distance effect 
in the size comparison task may be partly due to qualitative processing 
differences-comparisons of objects close in size may require a different 
type of information than comparisons of objects very different in size. 
Hypothesis 3: Imagery Is Never Used 
This third position derives from two directions of argument. First, a 
closer examination of empirical evidence seems to indicate that known 
properties of images are inconsistent with their playing a central role in 
mental size comparisons; second, there are reasonably clear alternative 
views of how analog information might be remembered. 
If people compare images to decide which of two objects are larger, 
one would expect that images must readily convey information about the 
typical size of objects. This would be the case if people directly retrieve 
from long-term memory images of objects at their canonical size. How- 
ever, Kosslyn (1975) has shown that people are quickest not to form 
images of animals at their canonical size, but rather to form the smallest 
size of image possible. This result is not affected by the objective size 
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of the animals (at least in the range of mouse to collie): Regardless of 
objective size, small images can be formed more quickly than larger ones. 
In addition, the simple fact that people can image objects at any size at all 
other than the canonical one seriously complicates the imagery hypothesis, 
since somehow it must ensure that both objects are imaged at the same 
scale before they are compared. 
Kosslyn presents a variety of evidence supporting the view that images 
are not remembered as units, but rather are constructed in active memory 
on the basis of more abstract perceptual information in long-term memory. 
Palmer (1975) has proposed that our perceptual knowledge of common 
objects may be stored in the form of abstract structural descriptions of 
prototypical exemplars. The representation of an object in such a model 
consists of hierarchically organized subunits. While these structural units 
are discrete, they may have analog parameters attached to them to indicate 
values on continuous dimensions. For instance, analog parameters might 
indicate the length of a giraffe’s neck, both relative to other subparts of the 
animal and on some absolute scale. Such abstract analog information 
could then be used to construct images of objects in active memory and 
to adjust two images to a common size scale. But in this view, the natural 
locus of the size comparison process is not images, but rather the under- 
lying analog parameters of structural descriptions. 
Note that this hypothesis is consistent with people’s intuitions that they 
form images when making size comparisons. The abstract analog param- 
eters may enter into image construction at the same time as they are used to 
compare sizes. It is even possible that instructing oneself to form images 
is an efficient way to activate size information, even though a size compari- 
son can then be made before the images are actually constructed. The 
time course of these two processes (image construction and magnitude 
comparison) may account for the intuition that images mainly accompany 
comparisons of pairs close in size. When the two objects are very dif- 
ferent in size, the comparison will be relatively fast and usually will be 
completed before the objects are imaged. When the objects are similar in 
size, on the other hand, the comparison will be slower and may not be 
completed until after the objects have been imaged. The important point 
is that while people may form images when making size comparisons, 
the quasi-perceptual properties of the resulting images may be epi- 
phenomenal with respect to the comparison process. 
Similarly, Paivio’s (1975) finding that size comparisons can be made 
more quickly when the items are presented as pictures rather than object 
names does not directly implicate imagery in the comparison process. It 
is only necessary to assume that pictures activate perceptual information 
in long-term memory more quickly than do words. It need not be the case 
that this perceptual information is either stored or processed in the form 
of images. 
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This third hypothesis does not explain the similarity of the distance 
effect found in symbolic and perceptual comparisons. However, it suggests 
that the particular function found may be peculiar not to perceptual and 
quasi-perceptual comparisons of entire objects, but rather to analog com- 
parisons in general. Accordingly, the explanation for the parallels between 
perception and memory should emerge with a general model of magnitude 
comparisons applicable to dimensions in either domain. A discussion 
of possible comparison models is provided by Holyoak and Walker (1976). 
It can be argued that the imagery hypothesis (hypothesis 1 above) is itself 
only a pseudo-explanation of the observed parallels. That hypothesis as- 
sumes that the effects obtained with perceptual comparisons should be 
obtained with imaginal comparisons as well, but does not directly explain 
why these effects should be obtained in either case. 
Design of the Experiments 
In the experiments to be reported, people were timed as they decided 
from memory which of two objects was the larger. If people compare 
images in order to reach a decision, it should be possible to affect their 
decision latency by distorting the relative size of their images of the two 
objects (Experiment I) or by requiring them to maintain irrelevant images 
while making the size comparison (Experiment II). Both these two experi- 
ments involved two groups of subjects that differed in instructions; one 
group was told that they must use imagery to make the size comparisons, 
while the other group was free to make their decisions in any way possible. 
From what is known about the properties of images, it should be possible 
to predict how different experimental manipulations will affect decision 
time for subjects who are told to use imagery. If these variables then affect 
control subjects in the same way, it would suggest that they also use 
imagery to perform the task. But if the patterns of results differ between 
the two groups, the discrepancies may suggest a different account of how 
people make mental size comparisons when not directed to use imagery. 
In addition, the objective difference between the sizes of the objects 
being compared was experimentally varied. If the role of imagery depends 
on how close in size the objects are, this distance factor should interact 
with variables that determine how easy it is to use imagery in the task. 
EXPERIMENT I 
On each trial in Experiment I, subjects were first told the name of an 
object and asked to image it either as large as possible, as small as possible, 
at its normal size, or not at all. They were then presented with the name 
of a second object and immediately had to determine which of the two 
objects was larger in the real world. If subjects make this decision by 
comparing images of two objects, then their initial image of the first object 
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should affect their decision time. In order to make an accurate decision 
both objects must presumably be imaged at their canoni& size. If the 
first object has been imaged larger or smaller than normal, the subject using 
imagery should need to change his initial image prior to the comparison. 
Similarly, if the subject initially did not form an explicit image of the 
first object, he should later have to construct a normal-sized image before 
he makes the size comparison. But if the subject initially formed a normal- 
sized image, he should be ready to make the comparison without changing 
his internal representation of the first object. Accordingly, he should per- 
form the task most quickly if he initially images the first object at its normal 
size. 
In contrast, the advantage of a normal-sized image should be reduced 
or eliminated if the subject can make the size comparison on the basis of 
information more abstract than visual imagery. It is possible that forming 
an image of an object out of proportion to its true size will interfere with 
the subject’s ability to retrieve the actual size, even if he is not using 
imagery to make the comparison. That is, thinking of a “medium-sized” 
object as very large or very small may simply be confusing. However, if 
the subject does not use imagery, then forming a normal-sized image 
should not lead to a faster decision than forming no image at all, which 
is also a semantically “neutral” condition. 
Another possible effect of manipulating image size depends on the con- 
gruence of the size of the initial image with the correct decision. Paivio 
(1975) has shown that when objects are presented for a size comparison 
by means of pictures, RT is increased if the sizes of the pictured objects 
do not correspond to their relative size in the real world. For example, 
a person can decide that zebras are larger than lamps more quickly when 
the zebra rather than the lamp is pictured as the larger object. Similarly, in 
the present study a person might be able to make the correct decision more 
quickly if he initially imaged the zebra as large rather than small. This 
congruence effect depends on the relationship between competing sources 
of size information-in the present paradigm, image size and actual size. 
Thinking of an object as very large may interfere with deciding it is the 
smaller of two presented objects, while thinking of an object as very small 
may interfere with deciding it is the larger of the pair. This interference 
may well be semantic rather than strictly imaginal; i.e., imaging an 
object as large may be functionally equivalent to simply thinking of it as 
large. Accordingly, decision time should be faster if the size of the initial 
image of the first object matches rather than mismatches the correct 
response, regardless of whether the subject actually uses imagery to make 
the comparison. 
The present study, unlike Paivio’s picture experiment, allows us to dis- 
tinguish between simple congruence of the initial image and the decision 
(which occurs when the first object is imaged at its normal size) and 
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“supercongruence” (as occurs when the larger object is imaged as ab- 
normally large, or the smaller object is imaged as abnormally small). 
If only the congruence effect’ operates, these latter conditions should 
produce even faster RT than the former. But if people actually are 
comparing canonical images to make a decision, normal-sized initial 
images should always facilitate the comparison process more than any 
nonnormal image. 
To summarize these predictions: If subjects actually compare normal- 
sized images of the two objects to evaluate relative size, they should re- 
spond most quickly if their initial image of the first object is normal. The 
no-image and matching size conditions (when size of image matches the 
correct response) should lead to slower decisions. The relative difficulty 
of the latter two conditions is not predicted. The mismatching size 
condition (when size of image does not match the correct response) 
should be slowest of all. In contrast, if subjects do not use imagery to 
make the comparison, then the only clear prediction is an increase in RT 
for the mismatching size condition. The normal-sized image condition 
should produce no greater advantage than the no-image condition. 
Method 
Sixty-four pairs of object names were selected from the norms provided by Paivio (1975). 
These norms provide the mean size rating of each item (on a l-9 scale) based on responses 
from 49 subjects. Thirty-two of the pairs contained items as close as possible in normative 
size,2 subject to the constraint that three graduate students agreed on the relative size of 
each pair. The other thirty-two pairs contained items extremely different in size. Paivio 
(1975) has shown that the ratio of the size of the larger to the smaller object, derived 
from his normative size ratings, is a good predictor of comparison latency. The 
mean size ratio of the close pairs used in the present study was 1.06 (range, 1 .Ol to 1.17), while 
for the distant pairs the mean was 4.64 (range, 2.16 and 6.96). 
Subjects were tested individually using a tachistoscope. All subjects received all four 
manipulations of the initial image of the first object. Before each trial, the experimenter 
said one of four words, “big,” “normal,” “small,” or “first,” to indicate the condition 
for the next trial. The subject then pressed a “start” button that initiated display of the 
first word at the top of the viewer. At the beginning of the experiment the subject was 
told that “big” meant he was to image the first object as large as he possibly could (illus- 
trated by a line-drawn picture of a cat occupying virtually all of a 7 x IO-in. rectangle on a 
piece of paper); “small” meant he was to image the object as small as possible while still 
being able to see it (ilIustrated by a drawing of a cat occupying approximately 1 x 0.75 in. 
in the center of the 7 x IO-in rectangle); “normal” meant he was to image the object at 
whatever size seemed most natural (illustrated by a cat occupying about 2 x 3 in. in the 
center of the rectangle); and “first” (standing for “first word”) meant that he should read 
the first word but try not to form an explicit image of the object at any size. He was told 
1 The congruence effect discussed here is not to be confused with the kind of congruity 
effect that depends on the form of the comparative (larger vs smaller) used in the question 
(Jamieson & Petrusic, 1975). 
2 Selecting very close items was recommended in a working paper by Kosslyn, Murphy, 
Bemesderfer, and Feinstein. 
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that in this condition he should not worry if an image came “automatically,” but to avoid 
making a deliberate effort to form an image. 
On each trial the subject had 5 set to prepare appropriately with the first word. The first 
word then disappeared and the second word appeared in a position below that of the first 
word. The subject was then timed as he chose the larger of the two objects, pressing either 
an upper or lower response button depending on whether the top (first) or bottom (second) 
word named the larger object. The correct response (top or bottom button) always matched 
the position of the larger object. The subject was told that the correct response always 
depended only on the size of the objects in the real world, not in his image, and that he 
should consider only “normal or average-sized examples” of the two objects in making his 
decision. He was also told that some of the pairs were very close in size, so that his opinion 
of which object was normally larger might be different from that of the experimenter. He 
was assured that this was fine as long as he made the decision that he thought was correct. 
While all subjects received the instructions described above, two descriptions of how to 
make the size comparisons were given to different groups of subjects. Subjects in the 
Control condition were told that it was essential that they be prepared with an image of the 
first object at the specified size (or no image) at the time the second word appeared, but that 
at this point they could do anything they like with the first image in order to make the 
comparison as rapidly as possible. These subjects were not told to use any particular 
technique in making the comparisons. Subjects in the Imagery condition were also told that it 
was critical to be prepared appropriately when the second word appeared, but also that they 
had to compare normal-sized images of the two objects on each trial before they responded. 
These subjects were told they could alter their image of the first object as soon as the second 
word appeared. In the “first” (no initial image) condition they were told to image both 
objects at their normal sizes as soon as the second word appeared. Imagery subjects were 
told that they should go through the process of normalizing and comparing images on each 
trial, even if they could have responded without doing so. 
Major points of the instructions were repeated at least twice to all subjects. All were 
told that the experimenter was interested in “what effect, it any, the size of the first image or 
having an image has on how long it takes to make the size comparison” (adding, in the 
Imagery condition, “using the technique of normalizing and comparing images”), and 
that for this reason it was critical that the instructions were followed on each trial. Twenty 
practice trials illustrating all experimental conditions were then administered, after which 
the subject was questioned as to his compliance with instructions. The test items were then 
presented. Afterward, the subject was again questioned about what he thought he was doing. 
Subjects in the Imagery condition were asked to estimate the proportion of trials on which 
they actually compared normal-sized images of the two objects before responding. All 
subjects (with the exceptions noted below) appeared to understand the instructions readily, 
and each reported that he was virtually always ready with an image at the specified size when 
the second word appeared. Some subjects reported having difficulty in avoiding an image of 
the first object in the “first” (no-image) condition, but most reported that they at least 
did not form images as clear as those in the “normal” condition. 
During the test trials, subjects were informed when they made a response indicating 
disagreement with the experimenter. When the subject reported that he actually disagreed, 
did not know the answer, or felt he had made an error, those facts were recorded. 
Across subjects each word pair appeared equally often in each of the four initial-image 
conditions and in each of the two possible orders (so that the first item presented was 
equally often the larger and the smaller one). For any one subject, each pair occurred only 
once in a single condition, and the order of conditions in the test series was randomized. 
Forty-eight Stanford undergraduates participated in the experiment either for pay or to 
satisfy a course requirement. Data from four other subjects tested in the Imagery condition 
were discarded. After the experiment, three gave indications they had not followed instruc- 
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tions (two reported comparing images on less than 60% of the trials, and one reported not 
comparing images in the “first” condition). The fourth subject had a mean RT more than 
twice as long as the mean for other Imagery subjects. 
Results and Discussion 
Both subjects and word pairs were treated as random effects in all 
analyses of variance reported in the present paper. F ratios for subjects 
and items were calculated separately and then combined to calculate 
minimum quasi-F ratios, min F’ (Clark, 1973). The assignment of items to 
treatments formed a latin-square design across subjects. To remove the 
effect of subject variability from the items x treatments interactions, 
the item analyses were done on difference scores between the mean RT 
for a particular item in a particular condition and the grand mean for all 
subjects in that latin-square group. All analyses were performed separately 
for Imagery and Control subjects. 
Subjects did not produce the expected response on 0.7% of the distant 
pairs and 14.3% of the close pairs. They reported being mistaken on all 
the disputed trials for distant pairs and 4.4% of the close pairs. For 3.5% 
of the close pairs the subjects did not know the answer, and for 7.4% 
they actually disagreed with the experimenter. Including RTs for the latter 
type of response did not alter the pattern of results in any way. Accord- 
ingly, the analyses below include RTs for disagreements. Data from trials 
when the subject admitted an error or did not know the answer was 
dropped. The number of disputed trials was virtually the same for Imagery 
and Control subjects, although Imagery subjects tended to make fewer 
admitted errors (1.8 vs 3.3%). 
The major RT results of the experiment are depicted in Fig. 1. Subjects 
in both instructional groups chose the larger object much more quickly 
for the pairs with large rather than small size differences, replicating the 
effect of symbolic distance obtained by Moyer (1973) and Paivio (1975). 
This RT difference was 493 msec for the Imagery group, min F’(1,56) 
= 59.3, p < .OOl, and 379 msec for the Control group, min F’(1,43) 
= 77.3, p < .OOl. Overall, subjects in the Control group responded 638 
msec more quickly than subjects in the Imagery group. The difference is 
not surprising, since instructions to the Imagery subjects stressed use of 
the imagery technique over speed. Imagery subjects not only had to use 
imagery to make their decisions, but also had to monitor their decision 
process to satisfy themselves that they were complying with instructions. 
The results of major interest center on the manipulation of the initial 
image of the first object. As Fig. 1 indicates, this factor depended 
critically on the instructional condition. The results for the Imagery 
subjects are fully consistent with the view that they compared images of 
the two objects at their canonical sizes in order to reach a decision. The 
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FIG. 1. Mean RT as a function of initial image of first object. Solid line, Imagery condi- 
tion; broken line, Control condition; filled circle, small size difference; open circle, large 
difference. 
overall differences among the four initial-image conditions were highly 
significant, min F’(3,105) = 10.6, p < .OOl. Differences among the four 
conditions were tested using the Newman-Keuls method (cu = .OS). 
Imagery subjects responded significantly more quickly when prepared with 
a normal-sized image than in any other condition. The no-image condition 
was 123 msec slower than the normal condition, while the matching-size 
condition was 190 msec slower. The difference between the latter two 
conditions was not significant. These results suggest that Imagery subjects 
actually performed mental operations to produce normal-sized images of 
the first object as soon as the second object was presented, changing the 
size of a nonnormal image or forming an image if they had not done so 
initially. Subjects in this group usually mentioned such processes when 
interviewed at the end of the experiment. Some subjects claimed to shrink 
or expand nonnormal images, while others claimed to simply replace 
them with a new image at normal size. 
In addition, the Imagery subjects showed a strong congruence effect 
when the first object was imaged at a nonnormal size. The decision was 
152 msec faster when the size of the initial image matched the correct 
response (big when the first object was the larger, small when the first 
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object was the smaller) than when the size mismatched the response. The 
latter condition was significantly slower than all of the other three treat- 
ments. The overall difference of 14 msec between preparation with a big 
image vs small image was not significant. These results extend to intemal- 
ized images the similar congruence effects that Paivio (1975) produced 
using pictures. But the congruence effect was clearly secondary for sub- 
jects in the Imagery condition, in that a normal-sized image of the first 
object produced faster mean RT than any nonnormal image size, even if 
the nonnormal size was congruent with the correct decision.3 
The overall differences among the four initial-image conditions were 
also significant for the Control subjects, min F’(3,126) = 8.42, p < .OOl. 
However, a Newman-Keuls test revealed a pattern very different from 
that obtained with Imagery instructions. A strong congruence effect was 
still evident: RT was 137 msec faster when the size of the first image 
matched rather than mismatched the response. The latter condition was 
significantly slower than all three of the other conditions. However, no 
RT differences between the no-image, normal-sized, and matching-size 
conditions approached significance; the largest difference was a 38msec 
trend in favor of the normal over the matching size condition. It might be 
claimed that the no-image and normal conditions did not differ because 
subjects actually formed normal images in both conditions. However, the 
fact that an RT difference between these conditions was obtained with 
Imagery instructions argues against this interpretation. These results are 
consistent with the view that subjects normally do not compare images in 
order to decide which of two objects is larger, but rather compare abstract 
size parameters that are independent of the size of visual images con- 
structed and maintained in active memory. 
The present findings clearly do not support the hypothesis that imagery 
is always used in the size comparison process. Neither do they support the 
view that imagery is more likely to play an essential role in comparisons 
of objects very close in size. The effect of the various initial-image 
conditions did not differ significantly between the close and distant 
pairs, min F’ C 1 for the Imagery group, min F’(3,131) = 1.30,~ > .20, 
for the Control group. As Fig. 1 indicates, the trend in the Control group 
was actually opposite to the prediction of hypothesis 2: There was a 
greater RT difference between the normal and matching conditions for 
distant than for close pairs. 
The only other RT difference that approached significance was an 
overall tendency for subjects to respond more quickly if the second item 
was the larger of the two. This difference was 82 msec for the Imagery 
group, min F’(1,67) = 3.70, p < .lO, and 61 msec for the Control group, 
min F’(1,58) = 3.29,~ < .lO. 
3 These results for the normal size, matching size, and mismatching size conditions have 
been replicated with the item set used in Experiment II. 
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We have assumed that the congruence effect-slower decision times 
when the initial size of the first object mismatches the correct decision- 
is to be interpreted as a type of associative interference. That is, thinking 
of an object as large conflicts with deciding it is the smaller, while thinking 
of an object as small conflicts with deciding it is the larger. Under this 
interpretation, the critical variable is the relation between the absolute 
size of the initial image and the relative size of the two objects. A possible 
alternative explanation based on imagery might claim that the critical 
variable is the relation between the absolute size of the initial image and 
the actual absolute size of the first object. For relatively large items (e.g., 
horse) the difference between a big image and normal will be less than the 
difference between a small image and normal, while for relatively small 
items (e.g., pencil), the difference between a small image and normal will 
be less than the difference between a large image and normal. If subjects 
shrink or expand nonnormal images to normal size before making size 
comparisons, then the closer the nonnormal image is to the normal size 
the faster the change may be effected. Accordingly, subjects should be 
relatively fast when their initial image is small if the first object is small 
in absolute terms and relatively fast when their initial image is big if the 
first object is large. 
It turns out than on average, items that are the larger in a pair will be 
large in absolute terms, while items that are the smaller will be small in 
absolute terms. In the present study the mean rated size of the larger items 
was 5.18, while the mean size of the smaller items was 2.87. This raises 
the possibility that the congruence effect is actually due to the relative speed 
of transforming big vs small initial images to normal. To test this possibility 
the mean RT advantage of big over small initial images (which was nega- 
tive when small was faster than big) was correlated with the rated size 
(from Paivio’s, 1975, norms) of the imaged first object. This analysis was 
based on 128 cases (64 pairs in each of two orders). The imagery hypothesis 
just outlined predicts that this correlation will be significantly greater than 
zero. The obtained correlations were r = .16 for the Imagery group and 
r = - .02 for the Control group. Neither of these correlations was signifi- 
cantly different from zero. It therefore appears that for both Imagery and 
Control subjects the relatively slow RT for the mismatching size condition 
was due not to the time required to change a nonnormal image to normal 
size, but to associative interference between size of the initial image and 
the correct decision. 
EXPERIMENT II 
Whereas the previous experiment attempted to affect people’s RT to 
make size comparisons by manipulating their image of one of the objects 
being compared, Experiment II introduced an irrelevant memory load to 
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be maintained during the decision process. Prior to each trial, subjects 
were read three digits and were told either to rehearse the names of the 
digits covertly or to image the corresponding symbols.4 They then 
continued one of these two activities while comparing the size of two 
objects from memory. If a subject on a particular trial also uses imagery to 
make the size comparison, simultaneously imaging the digits should 
occupy processing capacity needed to reach a correct decision, and 
consequently should increase RT. Rehearsing the digits should presumably 
share less processing capacity with the imagery system, and hence produce 
less interference. On the other hand, if the subject performs the size 
comparison without making essential use of visual imagery, the effects 
of the two types of interference should be more equal. In particular, if the 
comparison is based on abstract analog size parameters, there is no 
reason to expect selective interference from either verbal or imaginal 
processing. The present design is thus similar to other selective inter- 
ference paradigms used to investigate the role of imagery in other tasks 
(Brooks, 1968; Byrne, 1974; Elliott, 1973; Kosslyn, Holyoak, & Huffman, 
1976; Segal & Fusella, 1970). 
Method 
Sixty pairs of names of common objects were selected for the experiment. Thirty 
of these are relatively close in objective size (e.g., pencil and cigarefte). The other 30 
pairs were created by replacing the terms in each of the close pairs by objects with a much 
greater size difference (e.g., typewriter and tack). Twenty Stanford students were asked 
to rate each pair on a l-10 scale as to “how much difference in size you feel there is between 
the two objects,” with a rating of 10 indicating maximal difference. For this task the 
pairs were listed in random order on a sheet of paper. The mean rating of the 30 close pairs was 
3.64, and the mean rating of the 30 distant pairs was 7.92. The words in the two groups of 
pairs were balanced as closely as possible with respect to word length and frequency. 
The same equipment was used as in Experiment I. The procedure was outlined to the 
subjects in detail at the beginning of the session. Before each trial, the experimenter 
read three randomly selected digits, and said either “Image” or “Rehearse.” If he said 
“Image” the subject was to “picture the three digits in your mind as large and as clear as 
you can, in the order in which the experimenter says them.” During the instructional 
phase the subject was shown a picture of three large digits side by side in a 7 x IO-in. 
rectangle to illustrate how the digits should be imaged. The instruction “Rehearse,” on 
the other hand, was a cue for the subject “to repeat the names of the digits to yourself as 
rapidly as you can, over and over again.” It was emphasized that both imaging and rehears- 
ing were purely mental activities, e.g., the subject was not to repeat the digits aloud. 
The subject was instructed to continue imaging or rehearsing for 3 or 4 set until the 
activity was clearly established, and then to press the “start” button to initiate the trial. 
After a 500-msec delay, the names of two objects appeared side by side in the viewer. The 
subject then had to press the left response button if the left object was the larger one, and 
the right button if the right object was larger. Each response was correct equally often 
across all test trials. The criteria for deciding which object was generally bigger were 
4 This selective interference paradigm has been used for a different purpose by Stephen 
Kosslyn (personal communication). 
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outlined in the same way as in Experiment I. Subjects were told that it was critical that they 
try to continue imaging or rehearsing on each trial, even if it made their task more difficult. 
All subjects rehearsed digits on half the trials and imaged digits on the other half. These 
trials were randomly interspersed. As in the previous experiment, half the subjects (the 
Imagery group) were instructed to compare images to evaluate the size of the pairs. They were 
told they could image the objects at the same time as the digits by imagining the objects 
superimposed on top of their images of the digits. The other subjects (the Control group) were 
not told any specific method of making their decisions. 
Eighteen practice trials preceded the test trials, and as in Experiment I, subjects 
were questioned closely to ensure that they understood the instructions before the test 
trials began. At the end of the session, subjects were asked to estimate the proportion of 
trials on which they were able to continue rehearsing or imaging the digits until the final 
button press and also the proportion of trials on which they thought they used imagery to 
reach a decision. Any one subject saw each pair only once, in either the image-digit or the 
rehearse-digit condition, but across subjects all pairs appeared equally often in each inter- 
ference condition. 
Subjects were 36 Stanford undergraduates who participated either for pay or to satisfy a 
course requirement. Two other subjects tested under Imagery instructions reported 
being unable to image both digits and objects simultaneously, and their data were discarded. 
Results and Discussion 
The RT results of Experiment II are presented in Table 1. As in Experi- 
ment I, subject and item analyses were performed separately, with the 
latter being done on mean difference scores. Data from trials when the 
subject made errors (3.8%) or disagreed with the designated correct 
response (< 1%) were dropped. The data for Imagery and Control subjects 
were combined into a single set of analyses. 
As in the first experiment, subjects were able to decide which of two 
objects was the larger more quickly (by 253 msec) if the size difference 
was relatively large, min F’(1,49) = 35.6, p < .OOl. In addition, subjects 
who were told to compare images in order to make the comparisons again 
responded more slowly (by 335 msec) than did Control subjects, min 
F’(1,33) = 6.83,~ < .025. 
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The main effect of interference type was also significant, min F’( 1,47) 
= 18.6,~ C .OOl. Imaging digits slowed the size comparison process more 
than did rehearsing digits. This overall difference in the difficulty of the 
two tasks is not surprising, since rehearsing digits is certainly a well- 
practiced task, whereas imaging digits probably is not. In addition, the 
test pairs were presented visually, and imaging digits may have interfered 
to some extent with reading the words. As a result of this main effect, 
interactions involving type of interference are expressed as variations in 
how much extra interference was produced by imaging digits as opposed to 
rehearsing digits. 
The only large variation of this sort involved the two instructional 
groups. Imaging digits slowed decision time 123 msec more for the 
Imagery group than for the Control group. This interaction was reliable 
across the pairs used in the experiment, F( 1,29) = 11.7, p < .OOl, and 
also across subjects, F(1,32) = 4.23, p < .05, although min F’ fell short 
of significance, min F’(152) = 3.10, .05 < p < .lO. The effect of inter- 
ference type was also tested separately for each instructional group. 
Imaging digits added 206 msec to decision time in the Imagery group, 
a difference that was highly reliable, min F’(1,50) = 18.3, p < .OOl, 
while this difference was reduced to a nonsignificant 83 msec in the Control 
group, min F’(1,50) = 2.96, .05 < p < .lO. This result, like those of 
Experiment I, is consistent with the view that while people can compare 
images to evaluate relative size if instructed to do so, they otherwise make 
the decision using processes that are less dependent on visual imagery. 
This interpretation can only be made with caution, however, since it is 
possible that subjects in both groups were actually imaging, but Imagery 
subjects formed more detailed images and hence were more susceptible to 
imaginal interference. In addition, maximum interference was obtained 
when the more difficult secondary task (imaging digits) was combined 
with the more difficult primary task (making comparisons using imagery). 
It could be that the extra difficulty of these two tasks, rather than 
similarity of representations, was critical in producing selective inteference. 
As in the previous experiment, there were no significant interactions 
between the degree of size difference and any other variable. The only 
trend of any note was a 54-msec tendency for imaging digits to produce 
more interference with the close than with the distant pairs. However, 
this effect fell far short of significance, min F’(1,61) = 1.59, p > .20. 
Again, no strong evidence was found to support the hypothesis that 
imagery plays an especially important role in difficult size discrimination. 
The only strong effect on errors was a higher error rate for the close 
pairs (6.7%) than for the distant pairs (1.1%). There were slightly more 
errors made by the Control than by the Imagery group (4.6 vs 3.0%) and 
there were a few more errors made when rehearsing rather than imaging 
digits (4.3 vs 3’.4%). Subjects in both instruction groups estimated that they 
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were able to maintain the digits until the final button press on a somewhat 
greater percentage of the trials when the digits were rehearsed rather 
than imaged (85 vs 70%). Subjects in the Imagery group estimated that 
they used imagery on 91% of the trials, while Control subjects gave 
a mean estimate of 5%. These figures probably indicate little except 
that the Imagery subjects reported following instructions on most of the 
trials. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Summary and Implications 
The experiments reported here demonstrate that people, when in- 
structed to do so, are able to compare images of objects in order to make 
size comparisons from memory. Subjects instructed to use imagery could 
perform the task more quickly if they prepared themselves with an image 
of one of the objects at its normal size, rather than with an image 
that was abnormally big or small, or no image at all. In addition, subjects 
using imagery to perform size comparisons were subject to substantial 
selective interference when asked to maintain irrelevant images of digits 
simultaneously. These effects are consistent with what is known about 
the structural properties of images, and therefore, argue that imagery- 
instructed subjects make essential use of imagery when performing mental 
size comparisons. 
However, when people were not specifically instructed to use imagery to 
reach their decisions, the pattern of results changed radically. An initial 
image at normal size did not produce significantly faster decisions than 
no image, or a large or small image that was congruent with the correct 
decision. The only effect of image size shared by all subjects was the extra 
time required for decisions when the size of the initial image failed to 
match the correct decision. However, this congruence effect appeared to 
be due to associative interference rather than to imaginal processes. 
In addition, the selective interference created by simultaneously imaging 
irrelevant material was reduced for subjects not told to use imagery. 
Furthermore, the difficulty of the size discrimination did not interact with 
any other variable. The present study yields no support for the hypothesis 
that imagery is central to the size comparison process, even in decisions 
about objects very close in normative size. 
While the present results suggest that size comparisons do not depend 
on visual imagery, they certainly do not decide the issue. As was pointed 
out earlier, it is possible that the difference between Imagery and Con- 
trol subjects is essentially quantitative. Control subjects may use less de- 
tailed images, or rely on them less often, so that effects found with Imagery 
subjects are reduced in magnitude. The effects may become so small that 
the present designs were not sufficiently sensitive to detect them. Also, 
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it is possible that people have multiple ways to perform size comparisons. 
The paradigms used here may have made it difficult for subjects to use 
imagery, causing the Control subjects to employ a mode of processing 
that is less susceptible to interference by the auxiliary task imposed upon 
them. People not given such auxiliary tasks may nevertheless prefer to use 
imagery. However, the results of Experiment I offer some difficulties for 
the latter argument. Preparing with a normal-sized image of the first object 
would seem unlikely to inhibit the use of imagery in the comparison 
process. Nevertheless, the normal-sized condition did not produce signif- 
icantly faster decisions than the matching size or no-image conditions for 
Control subjects, even though the latter conditions produced more dif- 
ficulty for Imagery subjects. 
There are also limitations associated with the general method of com- 
paring results obtained with subjects told to use a particular mental 
process to perform a task with the results for subjects not so instructed. 
First, it is necessary that subjects be able to introspect about the process 
in order to understand the instructions and then monitor their own com- 
pliance with them. Imaginal processes have seemed especially suited to the 
instructional method, since subjects generally act as if they know what it 
means to vary the size of images, to image different objects at once, or 
to image objects interacting in various ways (Kosslyn, 1975; Paivio, 1971). 
But one would hesitate to try and instruct subjects to “compare analog 
size parameters” or to “search your semantic network.” Yet it may well 
be that the mental processes central to a cognitive task are simply not 
available to introspection. 
Even if subjects are able to introspect about the mental processes 
they use to perform a task, it may be that the act of introspection itself 
alters task performance. If so, it is possible that instructed subjects 
will yield a different pattern of results than control subjects even if all 
subjects use the same basic mental processes, simply because the in- 
structed subjects are thinking about these processes as well as using them. 
Finally, if the instructed and control subjects are to produce the same 
pattern of results, the experimenter must accurately formulate the 
“natural” mental processes into the instructions he gives his subjects. 
But it is always possible that what appears to be a minor detail in the 
specified procedure is actually a critical determinant of whether the in- 
structed subjects carry out the mental processes normally used in the task. 
For example, most subjects in the Imagery groups in the present experi- 
ments reported comparing the two objects by imaging them side by side. 
But it is possible that the “natural” comparison process involves super- 
imposing the two images or imaging the objects sequentially. Had subjects 
been instructed to use some different variation of an imaginal compari- 
son process, the results might have been altered. In general, if the in- 
structed group does not perform in the same way as the control group, 
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it is difficult to judge whether the differences are due to the radically 
different mental processes used by the two groups, or to minor variations in 
the same basic procedures. 
Further Issues 
While the present results are therefore only suggestive, the conclu- 
sion that finds most comfort is that visual imagery normally plays a less 
important role in the size comparison process than it does for imagery- 
instructed subjects. Yet all subjects, whether told to use imagery or not, 
were able to compare sizes much more quickly if the size difference be- 
tween the objects was large. This argues that if people normally do not 
compare images to perform the task, they nonetheless do compare some 
more abstract representation of size that bears an analog relationship to 
the size of actual objects. The nature of this representation still largely 
remains an open question. But it now appears, to some extent contrary 
to initial expectations, that this problem is best approached by attempting 
to develop a general model of analog comparisons, rather than by asking 
detailed questions about the respresentation of magnitude for particular 
dimensions. The present negative conclusions about the role of imagery in 
size comparisons in fact support the possibility of a domain-independent 
model, since imagery seems an implausible vehicle for comparisons 
involving numerical magnitude (Moyer & Landauer, 1967), or terms dif- 
fering in degree along such dimensions as time and quality (Holyoak 
& Walker, 1976). 
The optimal formulation of such a general comparison model is open to 
question. However, available evidence suggests that it will include some 
form of a stochastic information-sampling procedure. The basic assump- 
tion is that a person can judge the relative magnitude of two concepts 
by comparing the absolute magnitude information stored with each. The 
comparison process will involve the continuous retrieval of magnitude 
information for each concept, so that the precision of available informa- 
tion will increase with time. Initial information will be sufficient to dis- 
tinguish between concepts very different in magnitude (e.g., horse and 
cut), but more precise information (which takes more time to accumulate) 
will be needed to distinguish between concepts that are relatively similar 
in magnitude (e.g., horse and bear). The mechanism of such a comparison 
process might be formulated using various stochastic decision processes, 
such as a random walk (Buckley & Gillman, 1974), accumulator (Pachella, 
1974), or timing model (Lute & Green, 1972). The central assumption 
of all such formulations, that information is aggregated over time, will 
yield a distance effect. 
However, a number of important questions certainly remain in the do- 
main of size comparisons. Is size represented as a single parameter, 
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or is a size value for an object itself computed from more elementary 
dimensional values (i.e., for length, height, and width)? In the present 
experiments, as well as in previous studies of mental size comparisons, 
the objects to be compared usually have been chosen so as to be roughly 
comparable in shape and standard orientation. It is therefore possible 
that subjects in these experiments often judged relative size on the basis 
of a comparison of magnitude along the most salient dimension (e.g., 
height). This suggests that additional computations may be required for 
size comparisons involving objects that are dissimilar in shape or orienta- 
tion. People in fact report difficulty in comparing the size of objects such 
as a giraffe and an elephant, which differ in dominant axis. It is possible 
that visual imagery plays a much more active role in the size comparison 
process when it is necessary to form a global size estimate on the basis of 
the shape of the entire object. 
Another question concerns the standards used to represent the size of 
objects in memory. If people directly or indirectly store information about 
absolute size, what are the units of measurement? Are objects measured 
relative to prototypical or salient exemplars of a superordinate (e.g., a 
mouse is a small animal), relative to some common standard used for all 
objects (e.g., the size of a person), or in multiple ways? Paivio’s (1975) 
finding that comparisons between objects drawn from different semantic 
categories can be made just as quickly as comparisons between objects 
from the same category argues that at some level the size of all objects is 
represented on a common scale. 
Finally, it is clear that people know something about the variability 
among category exemplars along different dimensions (Walker, 1975). 
Variability information might itself be stored as an analog value, or it might 
be computed on the basis of some process akin to the “availability” 
or “representativeness” heuristics (Kahneman 8z Tversky, 1972; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973). Issues such as these are likely to reward further 
exploration. 
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